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Introduction
Gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls are central to achieving the United 
Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).1 An indicator of women’s equality 
and empowerment is the number of women on boards of directors and in senior management 
of firms. The Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) was amended in 2018 to mandate 
disclosure of the number of designated persons, the percentage of the board that they comprise, 
whether the firm has a written policy in respect of diversity and whether there are targets 
1 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UNGAOR, 70th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/70/1 
(2015) [2030 Agenda], online: <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E>. 
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for representation.2 The changes include gender diversity and disclosure of representation of 
minority groups, Aboriginal peoples and people with disabilities.3 
In this chapter, we consider the CBCA amendments in light of broader concerns associated 
with Canadian-based mining companies operating within and outside of Canada, including 
violations of rights of women and girls.4 The industrial mining sector is male dominated, and 
has faced accusations and lawsuits over gender bias, violence (including sexual violence) against 
women and children, health and safety problems, and environmental harms.5 The 2019 report 
of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG) 
explicitly linked resource extraction with violence against Indigenous women and girls.6 Among 
the calls to justice in the report are five aimed at “Extractive and Development Industries,” 
including that industries consider “safety and security of Indigenous women and girls” at “all 
stages of project planning, assessment, implementation, management, and monitoring.”7
This chapter aims to contribute to the literature on international law, women and mining from 
a Canadian perspective, focusing on legal developments related to corporate board diversity. We 
first examine the importance of women’s equality and empowerment in sources of international 
human rights and sustainable development law, and then consider Canadian initiatives aimed 
at the extractive sector. Second, we review the data on female representation on Canadian 
corporate boards and in senior management, with particular attention to the mining sector. 
Third, we consider insights and limitations of current literature on corporate board diversity, 
with attention to the definition of “firm performance,” arguing that it must account for respect 
for the rights of women and girls. A broader understanding of firm performance is essential in 
light of Canada’s promotion of business responsibilities to respect international human rights 
2 Bill C-25, An Act to amend the Canada Business Corporations Act, the Canada Cooperatives Act, the Canada Not-for-profit 
Corporations Act and the Competition Act, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2015 (assented to 1 May 2018), SC 2018, c 8; Regulations 
Amending the Canada Business Corporations Regulations, 2001, SOR/2019-258 [Regulations Amending]; Laura Levine, 
“Increased Diversity Disclosure for CBCA Corporations Coming in 2020” (9 August 2019), online: Stikeman Elliot 
LLP <www.stikeman.com/en-ca/kh/canadian-securities-law/Increased-Diversity-Disclosure-for-CBCA-Corporations-
Coming-in-2020>.
3 Regulations Amending, supra note 2, Part 8.2. Designated groups will be the same as under the Employment Equity Act, 
SC 1995, c 44, s 3; Corporations Canada, “Explanatory note on proposed regulatory amendments” (19 January 2018), 
online: <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cd-dgc.nsf/eng/cs07274.html>.
4 Sara L Seck & Penelope Simons, “Resource Extraction and the Human Rights of Women and Girls” (2019) 
31:1 CJWL 1 [Seck & Simons, “Resource Extraction”]; Sara L Seck & Penelope Simons, “Sustainable Mining, 
Environmental Justice, and the Human Rights of Women and Girls: Canada as Home and Host State” in S Atapattu, 
C Gonzalez & S Seck, eds, The Cambridge Handbook on Environmental Justice and Sustainable Development (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2020) [Seck & Simons, “Sustainable Mining”]; Katy Jenkins, “Review 
Article: Women, mining and development: An emerging research agenda” (2014) 1:2 Extractive Industries & Society 
329; Penelope Simons, “Unsustainable International Law: Transnational Resource Extraction and Violence against 
Women” (2017) 26:2 Transnat’l L & Contemp Probs 415; Raywat Deonandan, Kalowatie Deonandan & Brennan Field, 
“Mining the Gap: Aboriginal Women and the Mining Industry” (2016). 
5 Seck & Simons, “Resource Extraction”, supra note 4; Seck & Simons, “Sustainable Mining”, supra note 4; Jenkins, 
supra note 4; Simons, supra note 4; Deonandan, Deonandan & Field, supra note 4; UN Women, Promoting Women’s 
Participation in the Extractive Industries Sector: Examples of Emerging Good Practices (2016) at 10.
6 National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final 
Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, vol 1A (2019) at 584–94 
[MMIWG Report], online: <www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Final_Report_Vol_1a.pdf>.
7 Ibid at 196 (“Calls to Justice: Calls for Extractive and Development Industries 13.1–13.5”). The report includes the 
rights of “2SLGBTQQIA people.” 
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law at home and overseas.8 We conclude by considering different approaches to board and 
management diversity in light of the recent amendments to the CBCA,9 and offering 
recommendations for law and policy reforms as well as future research. 
International and Canadian Law and Policy 
Canada plays a prominent role in the global mining and natural resources industries.10 
Canada is the pre-eminent leader in mining finance, with more than 59 percent of the world’s 
extractive financing taking place through the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) or TSX-Venture 
(TSX-V).11 Canada is home to more than 214 TSX-listed companies, and 945 listed on 
the “junior” TSX-V.12 The Canadian mining industry has been implicated in human rights 
violations within Canada and internationally, including violations of the rights of women and 
girls.13 The most notorious international examples include those involving sexual violence, such 
as at Barrick Gold’s Porgera Mine in Papua New Guinea,14 or the allegations of gang rape in 
Guatemala that are the subject of the Hudbay litigation.15 Within Canada, concerns have been 
raised about increased violence against Indigenous women from mining activities, most recently 
in the MMIWG report.16 Gendered human rights violations also include environment-related 
violations of rights to health and food,17 intersectional violations of Indigenous rights,18 and 
employment-related dimensions of violations of a woman’s right to mine.19
Paragraph 46 of the Plan of Implementation of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg states that active participation of women and Indigenous 
communities is essential for sustainable mining development.20 Yet globally, women continue to 
8 Sara L Seck, “Business, Human Rights, and Canadian Mining Lawyers” (2015) 56 Can Bus LJ 208 [Seck, “Business, 
Human Rights”]; Sara L Seck, “Canadian Mining Internationally and the UN Guiding Principles for Business and 
Human Rights” (2011) 49 Can YB Intl L 51 [Seck, “Canadian Mining Internationally”].
9 Bill C-25, supra note 2.
10 Natural Resources Canada, “10 Key Facts on Canada’s Minerals Sector”, online: <www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.
gc.ca/files/emmc/pdf/2019/10-Key-Facts-on-Canada_s-Mineral-Sector-EN-access-1.pdf>; Natural Resources Canada, 
“Minerals and Metals Facts”, online: <www.nrcan.gc.ca/our-natural-resources/minerals-mining/minerals-metals-
facts/20507>.
11 TMX, “TMX TSX | TSXV — Mining”, online: <www.tsx.com/listings/listing-with-us/sector-and-product-profiles/
mining>.
12 Ibid.
13 Seck & Simons, Resource Extraction, supra note 4; Seck & Simons, “Sustainable Mining”, supra note 4. See also 
Kalowatie Deonandan & Colleen Bell, “Discipline and Punish: Gendered Dimensions of Violence in Extractive 
Development” (2019) 31:1 CJWL 24.
14 Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic & Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, “Righting 
Wrongs? Barrick Gold’s Remedy Mechanism for Sexual Violence in Papua New Guinea: Key Concerns and Lessons 
Learned” (2015).
15 Choc v HudBay Minerals Inc, 2013 ONSC 1414.
16 MMIWG Report, supra note 6.
17 Seck & Simons, “Sustainable Mining”, supra note 4.
18 Sarah Morales, “Digging for Rights: How Can International Human Rights Law Better Protect Indigenous Women 
from Extractive Industries?” (2019) 31:1 CJWL 58. 
19 See especially Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, “Do Women Have a Right to Mine?” (2019) 31:1 CJWL 1.
20 Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/CONF.199/20 (2002) at 6 
(“Resolution 2: Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development”) [“Plan of Implementation 
of the World Summit”]. For an assessment of the contested nature of this statement, see Sara L Seck, “Transnational 
Corporations and Extractive Industries” in Shawkat Alam et al, eds, International Environmental Law and the Global 
South (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 380.
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be under-represented, especially in positions of power.21 Indeed, women’s under-representation 
in leadership positions in Canada’s private sector was described as problematic by the UN 
Human Rights Committee in 2015.22 
The most recent global consensus on sustainable development, women’s empowerment and 
human rights is found in Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
which was endorsed by 170 world leaders in September 2015.23 Described as an action plan for 
“people, planet and prosperity,” the SDGs consist of 17 goals and 169 targets. According to the 
preamble, the SDGs should be implemented by every country and “all stakeholders, acting in a 
collaborative partnership” to urgently “shift the world on to a sustainable and resilient path.”24 
The preamble explicitly states that the SDGs “seek to realize the human rights of all and to 
achieve gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls.”25 SDG 16 promotes 
“peaceful and inclusive societies,” as well as “access to justice for all” and the building of “effective, 
accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.”26 
SDG 5 is of particular relevance to corporate board diversity. SDG target 5.5 is to “[e]nsure 
women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of 
decision-making in political, economic and public life.” Indicator 5.5.2 is the “[p]roportion of 
women in managerial positions,” while target 5.c is to “[a]dopt and strengthen sound policies 
and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all 
women and girls at all levels.”27 Therefore, to meet the SDGs, private sector actors must promote 
and enable women to take on leadership roles, and government regulation should advance this 
action. 
With regard to the extractive sector, the 2030 Agenda’s overarching vision is described as 
sustainable production and consumption, including sustainable use of natural resources.28 
Paragraph 67 of the 2030 Agenda calls upon “all businesses to apply their creativity and 
innovation to solving sustainable development challenges,” while protecting rights “in accordance 
with relevant international standards and agreements and other on-going initiatives…such as 
the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”29 [UNGPs]. The UNGPs date from 
2011, and are comprised of three pillars: the state duty to protect human rights, the business 
responsibility to respect human rights and the need for access to remedy. The Government 
21 Linda Doku, “Why the Mining Industry Needs More Women”, Forbes (24 May 2019).
22 Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Canada, UNESCOR, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/CAN/CO/6 (2015) at para 7.
23 2030 Agenda, supra note 1; Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, Human Rights and the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development, online: <www.ohchr.org/en/issues/SDGS/pages/the2030agenda.aspx>; United Nations, 
“Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform”, online: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/summit>.
24 2030 Agenda, supra note 1 at Preamble.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid at Goal 16.
27 Ibid at Goal 5.
28 Ibid at para 9. 
29 Ibid at para 67; Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie: Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UNGAOR, 17th Sess, UN 
Doc A/HRC/17/31 (2011) [UNGPs].
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of Canada has promoted the UNGPs to Canada’s mining sector operating internationally.30 
If women held equal power at the board level, they would be better positioned to contribute 
to ensuring business respect for human rights in sustainable mining, including respect for the 
human rights of women and girls. 
Other international initiatives support corporate board diversity as well. The Women’s 
Empowerment Principles (WEP) are a joint initiative of UN Women and the UN Global 
Compact.31 Subtitled “Equality Means Business,” the principles seek to emphasize the “business 
case for corporate action.”32 Principle 1 of the WEP is “[e]stablish high-level corporate leadership 
for gender equality,” while Principle 2 is “[t]reat all women and men fairly at work — respect 
and support human rights and nondiscrimination.”33 Chief executive officers (CEOs) should 
issue a “statement of support” that “encourages business leaders to use the seven Principles as 
guide posts for actions that advance and empower women in the workplace, marketplace and 
community.”34 Yet, implementation of the WEP has been critiqued.35
The relationship between the business responsibility to respect rights and implementation of the 
SDGs has received increasing attention,36 and international instruments have actively aligned 
their guidance with the SDGs.37 From a human rights perspective, the 1979 Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women is the key widely ratified 
foundational human rights instrument.38 A March 2019 report by the Working Group on 
Business and Human Rights (WGBHR) on the gender dimensions of the UNGPs notes that 
while “women’s human rights are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of universal human 
rights,” and businesses and states “should take concrete steps to identify, prevent and remedy 
gender-based discrimination and inequalities in all areas of life,” in reality, neither “have paid 
30 UNGPs, supra note 29. On Canada’s endorsement of the UNGPs and promotion of them to the mining sector, see Seck, 
“Business, Human Rights”, supra note 8; Seck, “Canadian Mining Internationally”, supra note 8.
31 UN Women & UN Global Compact, “Women’s Empowerment Principles”, online: <www.empowerwomen.org/en/
weps/about>; UN Global Compact, “Endorse the Women’s Empowerment Principles”, online: <www.unglobalcompact.
org/take-action/action/womens-principles> [UNGC, “WEP”].
32 UNGC, “WEP”, supra note 31.
33 Ibid. The other principles are: “Principle 3: Ensure the health, safety and well-being of all women and men workers; 
Principle 4: Promote education, training and professional development for women; Principle 5: Implement enterprise 
development, supply chain and marketing practices that empower women; and Principle 7: Measure and publicly report 
on progress to achieve gender equality.”
34 Ibid.
35 Gender dimensions of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Report of the Working Group on the issue of 
human rights and transnational enterprises, 42nd Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/41/43 (2019) [WGBHR, Gender dimensions].
36 Shift & Business and Sustainable Development Commission, Business, Human Rights and the Sustainable Development 
Goals: Forging a Coherent Vision and Strategy (2016) at 34–35, online: <http://s3.amazonaws.com/aws-bsdc/BSDC-
Biz-HumanRights-SDGs.pdf>; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The business and human rights 
dimension of sustainable development: Embedding ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ in SDGs implementation (30 June 2017), 
online: <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/Session18/InfoNoteWGBHR_SDGRecommendations.pdf>. 
37 UN Global Compact, “Advancing Sustainable Development”, online: <www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/our-work/
sustainable-development>; GRI, “GRI and the Sustainable Development Goals”, online: <www.globalreporting.org/
information/SDGs/Pages/SDGs.aspx>; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD 
and the Sustainable Development Goals: Delivering on universal goals and targets, online: <www.oecd.org/dac/sustainable-
development-goals.htm>.
38 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 18 December 1979, Can TS 1982 No 31 
(entered into force 3 September 1981; entered into force for Canada 9 January 1982). 
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adequate attention to gender equality” in meeting their respective human rights responsibilities 
and obligations.39 
The annex to the WGBHR report contains a set of 31 guiding principles on gender that align 
with the “protect, respect, and remedy” framework of the UNGPs. Principle 1 highlights the 
duty of states to ensure respect of women’s human rights by business enterprises, including 
through implementation of legislation.40 States should “encourage business enterprises to 
appoint a certain percentage of women to their boards” and report “on the gender pay gap 
throughout their operations.”41 State-owned and controlled enterprises should “lead by example 
in achieving substantive gender equality” and use “leverage to require their business partners to 
do the same.”42 These enterprises should “appoint a certain percentage of women to their boards 
and annually disclose data on progress made in achieving gender parity in employment.”43
Principle 11 concerns the responsibility of businesses to avoid infringing the human rights 
of women, including by reproducing existing discrimination in their own operations, and to 
“address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”44 Illustrative actions 
include “affirmative action and professional development support” and to ensure “equal 
representation of women in the workforce at all levels, including on boards.”45 Principle 19 
recommends implementation of “gender-transformative measures to prevent and mitigate 
adverse impacts” identified through impact assessment processes.46 Illustrative actions include 
revising policies and management processes to address systemic concerns for women, and 
adopting “affirmative action policies to overcome underrepresentation of women in managerial 
positions and on boards.”47
Despite international consensus in 2002 on the importance of the active participation of women 
and Indigenous communities for sustainable mining development,48 to date, few international 
guidance tools promoted to the mining sector have explicitly embedded respect for the human 
rights of women and girls.49 Human rights due diligence is an expectation for all businesses, 
and must receive attention in guidance tools for mining companies.50 Yet while the 2017 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement in the Extractive 
39 WGBHR, Gender dimensions, supra note 35 at para 3; ibid (“gender refers to socially constructed roles of and power 
relations among men, women and gender non-binary persons” at para 9).
40 Ibid at Annex (“Gender guidance for the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”), Guiding Principle 1. 
41 Ibid at para 4(b).
42 Ibid at Guiding Principle 4.
43 Ibid at para 8(d).
44 Ibid at Guiding Principle 11.
45 Ibid at para 22(g). 
46 Ibid at Guiding Principle 19.
47 Ibid at para 38(a)(i), (iii), (iv).
48 See “Plan of Implementation of the World Summit”, supra note 20 at para 46.
49 Seck & Simons, “Sustainable Mining”, supra note 4; Global Affairs Canada, “Canada’s Enhanced Corporate Social 
Responsibility Strategy to Strengthen Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad: Doing Business the Canadian Way: A 
Strategy to Advance Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad” (14 November 2014), 
online: <www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-strat-rse.
aspx?lang=eng>; Global Affairs Canada, “Responsible Business Conduct Abroad”, online: <www.international.gc.ca/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/other-autre/csr-rse.aspx?lang=eng#RBCGuidelines>. 
50 Daniela Chimisso dos Santos & Sara L Seck, “Human Rights Due Diligence and Extractive Industries” in Surya Deva, 
ed, Research Handbook on Human Rights and Business (Edward Elgar, forthcoming 2020). 
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Sector dedicates an annex to gender, it does not adopt a human rights approach.51 In 2019, the 
Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada adopted its own guidance document for 
gender diversity and inclusion.52 
While gender inclusive rights-respecting guidance is essential to ensure businesses are able 
to implement their independent responsibility to respect human rights, states also have 
international human rights obligations. Additional opportunities exist to ensure that Canadian 
domestic law guarantees respect for the rights of women and girls in resource extraction, in 
particular Indigenous women as noted by the MMIWG report.53 A recent domestic law reform 
initiative has integrated Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) into federal impact assessment 
legislation.54 A second recently adopted domestic law reform initiative is legislation promoting 
corporate board diversity. The next section will examine the current state of Canadian board 
diversity, with particular attention on the mining sector.
Canadian Board and Management Diversity Data 
Canada has low female representation on corporate boards compared to the percentage of 
women in the general population.55 The TSX, and its more than 800 companies, has a female 
representation rate of 16.4 percent.56 The rate of female representation on corporate boards jumps 
to 28.4 percent for the S&P/TSX 60 index, where only the large companies are included.57 This 
percentage is comparable to the Australian S&P/ASX 100 at 31 percent, and the UK Financial 
Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 index at 30 percent.58 Examining a broader cross-section 
of stock exchanges, women comprise only 10.3 percent of directorships, with the lowest rates 
occurring in Chile, Japan and Morocco, and the highest occurring in France, Norway and 
Sweden.59 Significant changes can occur in relatively short time periods, with France doubling 
female representation in five years, whereas Norway has fallen in the same time period.60 There 
are no longer any all-male boards among the S&P/TSX 60 companies.61 
51 OECD, “OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement in the Extractive Sector” (2017) 
at Annex C (“Engaging with Women”), online: <http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/stakeholder-engagement-extractive-
industries.htm>.
52 Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada, “Gender Diversity and Inclusion Guidance Document”, online: 
<www.pdac.ca/priorities/responsible-exploration/gender/gender-diversity-and-inclusion-guidance-document>.
53 MMIWG Report, supra note 6.
54 Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c 28, s 2(2.1). GBA+ is used to analyze sex and gender as factors underlying and 
intersecting with other identity factors that may be disproportionately impacted by proposed activities. See Impact 
Assessment Agency of Canada, Practitioner’s Guide to Federal Impact Assessments Under the Impact Assessment Act, s 2(2.1), 
“Guidance: Gender-Based Analysis Plus in Impact Assessment”, online: <www.canada.ca/en/impact-assessment-
agency/services/policy-guidance/practitioners-guide-impact-assessment-act/gender-based-analysis.html>.
55 Andrew MacDougall & John Valley, 2017 Diversity Disclosure Practices: Women in leadership roles at TSX-listed companies 
(Toronto: Osler, 2017) at 10 [MacDougall & Valley, 2017 Diversity Disclosure Practices]. 
56 Andrew MacDougall & John Valley, 2018 Diversity Disclosure Practices: Women in leadership roles at TSX-listed companies 
(Toronto: Osler, 2018) at 3, 16 [MacDougall & Valley, 2018 Diversity Disclosure Practices]. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Hampton-Alexander Review, FTSE Women Leaders Improving gender balance in FTSE Leadership (2018) at 9, 34 [FTSE 
Women]. 
59 Ibid at 35.
60 Data for 2018 from ibid at 35; data for 2013 from Siri Terjesen, Ruth Aguilera & Ruth Lorenz, “Legislating a Woman’s 
Seat on the Board: Institutional Factors Driving Gender Quotas for Boards of Directors” (2015) 128 J Business Ethics 
233 at 234. 
61 MacDougall & Valley, 2018 Diversity Disclosure Practices, supra note 56 at 23.
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Large companies (greater than CDN$10 billion of market capitalization) have higher rates of 
female representation than smaller firms.62 The percentage of boards without women has declined 
to 31.3 percent, while the percentage of boards with at least two women has increased to 33.7 
percent.63 This statistic is important, as research indicates that a critical mass of representation 
is required to be effective.64 Strides are being made but have not yet been embraced by one 
important industry — the mining industry. 
Canada has a concentrated stock market, with approximately one-third being extractives 
companies, which lag in female board representation, with mining having 11 percent 
representation.65 Yet direct comparisons with other stock markets are difficult. The US markets 
are comprised of a broad range of companies, and mining firms are less important than in 
Canada.66 Australia and South Africa are similar to the Canadian market, as approximately 33 
percent of firms listed are financial services and 15.5 percent are extractives.67 Historically, these 
two industries are divergent, with the former having among the highest female representation 
rate and the latter having the lowest.68 Policies in Australia and South Africa have assisted in 
pushing higher numbers of female participation, with South Africa having the largest percentage 
of women on mining boards.69
Mining suffers from a glaring lack of gender diversity at all levels, from entry-level positions up 
to the corporate and board levels.70 Globally, women comprise only 10 percent of the industrial 
mining workforce, while in Canada it is 17 percent.71 Internationally, a 2013 study noted a 
severe shortage of women on boards of mining companies, and by 2015 the pipeline of female 
62 Companies less than CDN$1 billion in market capitalization have 10 percent female participation. Approximately  
65 percent of TSX-listed companies fall under CDN$1 billion in market capitalization. Canadian Securities 
Administration (CSA), “Roundtable Discussion — Third Review of Women on Boards and in Executive Officer 
Positions” (24 October 2017) at 13 [CSA, “Roundtable Discussion”], online: <www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/
Securities-Category5/sn_20171103_transcript-wob-roundtable.pdf>; CSA, “Staff Review of Women on Boards and in 
Executive Officer Positions Compliance with NI 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices”, CSA Staff 
Notice 58-309 (5 October 2017) at Figures 3.1, 4.2.
63 Ibid at 22.
64 Hisham Farag & Chris Mallin, “Board diversity and financial fragility: Evidence from European banks” (2017) 49 Intl 
Rev Financial Analysis 98; Carolyn Wiley & Mireia Monllor-Tormos, “Board Gender Diversity in the STEM&F 
Sectors: The Critical Mass Required to Drive Firm Performance” (2018) 25:3 J Leadership & Organizational Studies 
290. This is explained by signalling theories. 
65 TMX, “TSX Market Statistics, The MiG Report”, online: <www.tsx.com/resource/en/2014/mig-report.pdf>; 
MacDougall & Valley, 2018 Diversity Disclosure Practices, supra note 56 at 19, 25. 
66 NYSE is the oldest stock exchange and a traditional auction market, while the NASDAQ is a dealer market. Thus, they 
differ in both size and types of listings, but also in fundamental operational methods. 
67 Canaccord Genuity, “Overview of the Australian Share Market”, online: <www.psl.com.au/Wealth-Management/
News-Insights/Article-Library/Overview-of-the-Australian-Share-Market>; ASX List, “ASX 100 List”, online: <www.
asx100list.com/>.
68 MacDougall & Valley, 2018 Diversity Disclosure Practices, supra note 56; CSA, “Report on Fourth Staff Review of 
Disclosure Regarding Women on Boards and in Executive Officer Positions”, CSA Multilateral Staff Notice 58-310  
(27 September 2018) [CSA, “Report on Fourth Staff Review”]; CSA, “Roundtable Discussion”, supra note 62 at 11.
69 International Women in Mining & PwC, Mining for talent: A study of women on boards in the mining industry (London, 
UK: PwC, 2016) at 2, 11, 14. 
70 Women in Mining Canada, Welcoming to Women: An Action Plan for Canada’s Mining Employers (2016) at 5, online: 
<https://wimcanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/WIM-NAP-book-full.pdf>.
71 Mining Industry Human Resources Council, Strengthening Mining’s Talent Alloy: Exploring Gender Inclusion (2016) 
online: <www.mihr.ca/pdf/publications/MiHR_Gender_Report_EN_WEB.pdf>. On women’s experiences in the 
male-dominated occupations, see e.g. Phiona Marin & Antoni Barnard, “The experience of women in male-dominated 
occupations: A constructivist grounded theory inquiry” (2013) 39:2 South African J Industrial Psychology.
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talent in the industry was actually falling.72 Yet the study observed: “there is no shortage of 
women in the talent pool; there is simply a perception of a lack of available female talent.”73 In 
2009, Women in Mining Canada formed in order to better enable empowerment of women in 
the sector.74 During the same period, the UK market had the most significant increase in female 
representation, likely due to increased regulatory scrutiny.75 
The number of junior mining companies may also be relevant to the challenge of female 
representation. Junior mining companies tend to be small, and they may have only a few 
employees.76 Many have little to no profit (many operate at a loss) and often have no revenue.77 
The TSX’s approximately 815 listed companies include significant numbers that have market 
capitalizations of less than CDN$100 million.78 
Educational background is relevant to board membership and senior management service. Bias 
over educational requirements may be a factor, with 100 percent of female board members in 
the mining sector having undergraduate degrees and 69 percent having completed postgraduate 
study; 97 percent of male directors hold an undergraduate degree and 54 percent hold 
postgraduate degrees.79 The most common degrees for female directors are finance/economics, 
whereas male directors are more likely to hold mining and engineering degrees.80 Some argue 
that this is one reason why greater numbers of female engineers and mining science graduates are 
so desperately needed. While Canada now advocates STEM (science, technology, engineering 
and math) careers for women, there is a long way to go,81 as only 16 percent of Canadian 
mining/mineral engineers are female.82 This, together with the small number of women in junior 
positions, suggests change will be slow. Graduates of MBAs and engineering programs take 
time to work their way up the corporate ladder. In 2015, Engineers Canada launched its “30 by 
30” program to increase the number of newly licensed female engineers to 30 percent by 2030.83 
72 International Women in Mining & PwC, supra note 69 at 2; Women in Mining (UK) & PwC, Mining for talent 2015:  
A review of women on boards in the mining industry 2012–2014 (London, UK: PwC, 2015) at 13. In 2013, globally, 
women occupied eight percent of board seats in the top 100 mining companies, and there were four female executive 
directors.
73 Ibid at 25.
74 Women in Mining Canada, “Who we are”, online: <https://wimcanada.org/who-are-we/>.
75 Women in Mining (UK) & PwC, supra note 72 at 17. 
76 TSX-V, Market Insight 7 (30 September 2016); TSX, “Current Market Statistics”, online: <www.tsx.com/listings/
current-market-statistics>.
77 TMX Money, “S&P/TSX Venture Composite Index”, online: <https://web.tmxmoney.com/index_constituents.php?qm_
symbol=^JX>.
78 TSX, “excel spreadsheet, tsx-andamp-tsxv-listed-companies-2018-07-13-en”, online: <www.tsx.com/listings/current-
market-statistics>.
79 Women in Mining (UK) & PwC, supra note 72 at 18.
80 Ibid.
81 Government of Canada, “The Government of Canada and STEM”, online: <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/013.nsf/eng/00014.
html>.
82 Engineers Canada, “Canadian Engineers for Tomorrow”, online: <https://engineerscanada.ca/reports/canadian-
engineers-for-tomorrow>; Engineers Canada, “Women in Engineering”, online: <https://engineerscanada.ca/diversity/
women-in-engineering>.
83 Engineers Canada, “2018 National Membership Information”, online: <https://engineerscanada.ca/reports/national-
membership-report/2018-report>.
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Board Diversity and Firm Performance: Gender and 
Mining
International instruments are pushing for corporate board and senior management diversity 
as part of a movement toward implementation of international human rights and sustainable 
development law. Yet the rationale for increased numbers of women on corporate boards differs 
depending on whether the focus is on women’s empowerment or on the protection of the 
human rights of women who may be adversely impacted by industrial mining yet are not part 
of the enterprise. 
The UN Global Compact claims there is a business case for corporate action on gender equality 
and women’s empowerment, as well as a gender equality justification.84 Research shows that 
having more women on boards leads to lower volatility in share prices, and higher return on 
equity.85 There is clear and concrete evidence showing gender diversity and equality means 
greater profit and lower risk for companies. Increased gender diversity and younger average 
board age are shown to have strong associations with improved share price performance. These 
findings are mainly attributed to human capital and signalling theories.86 Women directors 
have a stronger quantitative impact on conditionally high-performance firms compared to low-
performance firms.87 While one study did not find that returns were materially different for 
companies with greater gender representation,88 the same study showed that additional women 
were found to lead to lower financial risk.89 Another study found a statistically significant 
positive relationship between a diverse board and company performance.90 Other research has 
found that, over the long term, firms with lower risk should be able to survive market-shocking 
events such as corrections, contractions and bubbles. Whether it is higher returns or lower risk, 
the result is the same: more women lead to financial improvement. 
More importantly, in our view, an increased number of women on boards of directors is associated 
with greater firm commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR), environmental 
84 UN Global Compact, “Gender equality” (“Companies that focus on women’s empowerment experience greater business 
success. Research shows investing in women and girls can lead to increases in productivity, organizational effectiveness, 
return on investment and higher consumer satisfaction”), online: <www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/our-work/
social/gender-equality>.
85 Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, “Women the X-Factor” (7 March 2018) at 1, online: <https://mlaem.fs.ml.com/
content/dam/ML/bulletin/PDFs/ml_women-the-X-factor-BAML-Report.pdf>; Daniel Low, Helen Roberts & 
Rosalind Whiting, “Board gender diversity and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Malaysia and Singapore” (2015) 35 Pacific-Basin Finance J 381; Martin Conyon & Lerong He, “Firm performance 
and boardroom gender diversity: A quantile regression approach” (2017) 79 J Business Research 198; Shams Pathan & 
Robert Faff, “Does board structure in banks really affect their performance?” (2013) 37:5 J Banking & Finance 1573; 
Emma García-Meca, Isabel-María García-Sánchez & Jennifer Martínez-Ferrero, “Board diversity and its effects on 
bank performance: An international analysis” (2015) 53 J Banking & Finance 202.
86 Cobus CH Taljaard, Michael JD Ward & Chris J Muller, “Board Diversity and Financial Performance: A Graphical 
Time-Series Approach” (2015) 18:3 South African J Economic & Management Sciences 425. 
87 Conyon & He, supra note 85.
88 Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, supra note 85 at 5.
89 Ibid at 6; Victoria Geyfman, Wade A Cooper & Laura M Davis, “Board Gender Diversity and Bank Performance” 
(2018) 18:1 J Business Diversity 51.




sustainability and improved decision making more generally.91 Gender diversity also leads to 
innovation and respect for different viewpoints, both of which prepare businesses for inclusivity 
and sustainability.92 These would seem essential for tackling the challenges facing mining 
companies.
Others critique this justification for addressing inequitable board/management diversity, raising 
concerns that it reinforces unverifiable assumptions about human behaviour, with causation 
unprovable.93 According to this view, companies with effective gender diversity programs are 
already run more efficiently, so gender diversity “is only one result and a correlation not a 
cause.”94 The outcome of this debate remains to be seen. 
This brief overview of studies examining justifications for increased gender diversity on corporate 
boards and in senior management suggests that while arguments could be made that increased 
gender diversity leads to better financial, social and environmental results for businesses, at best 
there is evidence of a correlation. The WGBHR proposes a different justification for states 
taking action to address the problems of the mining industry: to encourage business enterprises 
“to contribute to achieving substantive gender equality” would “enable the enterprises to 
discharge their responsibility to respect women’s human rights.”95 This broader understanding is 
consistent with Canada’s commitment to respect international human rights law in operations 
both at home and overseas.
Approaches to Board Diversity: “Comply or 
Explain” and Quotas
Two types of interventions are believed to be most effective to increase the number of women 
on boards and senior management: comply or explain (CoE), and quotas. 
CoE
CoE requires companies to disclose how many women are on boards and/or in executive officer 
positions, and whether there is a policy for diversity.96 If they do not have targets or goals, then 
the company needs to publicly explain why it does not, with a goal of applying pressure on 
91 Dolors Setó-Pamies, “The Relationship between Women Directors and Corporate Social Responsibility” (2015) 
22:6 Corporate Social Responsibility & Environmental Management 334; Corinne Post, Noushi Rahman & 
Cathleen McQuillen, “From Board Composition to Corporate Environmental Performance Through Sustainability-
Themed Alliances” (2014) 130 J Business Ethics 423; Lin Liao, Le Luo & Qingliang Tang, “Gender diversity, board 
independence, environmental committee and greenhouse gas disclosure” (2015) 47:4 British Accounting Rev 409; Aaron 
A Dhir, Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance & Diversity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) at 118–29 (noting improvements in decision-making processes and risk mitigation with 
increased gender diversity).
92 Irene Lynch Fannon, “‘A Toad We Have to Swallow’: Perceptions and Participation of Women in Business and the 
Implications for Sustainability” in Irene Fannon & Beate Sjafell, eds, Creating Corporate Sustainability: Gender as an 
Agent for Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 114 at 129.
93 Ibid at 123–24.
94 Kim Willey, “Bringing Canadian Women on Board: A Behavioural Economics Perspective on Whether Public 
Reporting of Gender Diversity Will Alter the Male-Dominated Composition of Canadian Public Company Boards and 
Senior Management” (2017) 29:1 CJWL 182 at 183, 191. 
95 WGBHR, Gender dimensions, supra note 35, Annex at para 2(c).
96 Walid Ben-Amar, Millicent Chang & Philip McIlkenny, “Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Response to 
Sustainability Initiatives: Evidence from the Carbon Disclosure Project” (2017) 142 J Business Ethics 369.
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public companies through mandatory transparency.97 CoE is preferred in Canada, Australia 
and the United Kingdom, because its goal is to increase transparency and disclosure to widely 
dispersed shareholders.98 These soft law measures, allowing parties to disclose their strategies 
and activities, are considered the preferred regulatory tool to gradually, but steadily, increase 
diversity through various market practices and mutual understanding of needs.99 Companies 
remain able to not comply. The only obligation is to explain the non-compliance in order to 
convince the outside world that being non-compliant is as appropriate as complying.100 CoE, 
problematically, often follows this one-size-fits-all approach.101 This contributes to a lack of 
dialogue between management and shareholders about diversity: “shareholders and investors are 
predominantly focused on short-term prospects and are diverted from evaluating the potential 
positive long-term effects.”102 
Securities law is predicated on disclosure of material information.103 Investors can make 
informed decisions if they possess all material information about a company.104 Materiality, to 
which disclosure obligations are oriented, is subject to a great deal of academic debate and is 
traditionally viewed as information that a reasonable investor would view as relevant to making 
an investment decision.105 Companies are confronting a “disclosure dilemma,” in that too much 
information can be as bad as too little.106 
Regulatory authorities are attempting to balance the requirements of disclosure of board 
composition. The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), Canada’s largest provincial regulator, 
adopted its CoE disclosure model in 2014, which was subsequently adopted by most (but not 
all) other provinces.107 In order to improve the relationship between firms and shareholders, the 
Canadian CoE model requires public disclosure documents to address compliance with a range 
of diversity initiatives or explain non-compliance.108 NI 58-101 focuses on five disclosure areas, 
including targets and policies of identifying, nominating and selecting women on boards and as 
executive officers, term limits or other mechanisms of board renewal.109 
97 Jean-Christophe Duhamel, “‘Comply or Explain’ Approach as a Pascalian Wager” (2015) 5:3 Accounting, Economics & 
L 289 at 290.
98 Konstantinos Sergakis, “Deconstruction and Reconstruction of the ‘Comply or Explain’ Principle in EU Capital 
Markets” (2015) 5:3 Accounting, Economics & L 233.
99 Ibid at 236.
100 Duhamel, supra note 97 at 290.
101 Sergakis, supra note 98 at 255.
102 Duhamel, supra note 97 at 291.
103 Kurt Schulzke & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, “Towards a Unified Theory of Materiality in Securities Law” (2017) 56 
Colum J Transnat’l L 6 at 8.
104 Alison Miller, “Navigating the Disclosure Dilemma: Corporate Illegality and the Federal Securities Laws” (2014) 102 
Georgetown L Rev 1647 at 1652.
105 Schulzke & Berger-Walliser, supra note 103 at 8, 9.
106 Miller, supra note 104 at 1649, 1653.
107 Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), Amendment Instrument for National Instrument 58-101, Disclosure of Corporate 
Governance Practices 1 (11 December 2014). 
108 OSC, National Instrument 58-101, Corporate Governance Disclosure (17 November 2015), ss 11–15; Sir Adrian Cadbury, 
Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (London, UK: Gee, 1992) [Cadbury Report] 
at 2.8; Maria Elisabeth Sturm, “Corporate Governance in the EU and U.S.: Comply-or-Explain Versus Rule” (2016) 
European Union Law Working Papers No 16, Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Technology Law Forum at 9.
109 Ibid; see also CSA, “Report on Fourth Staff Review”, supra note 68 at 11. 
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Despite the implementation of CoE in Canadian securities law, the federal government 
determined that variations on this approach should be implemented in federal corporate 
law.110 Bill C-25 received royal assent on May 1, 2018, and includes new diversity disclosure 
requirements, consistent with CoE.111 Federally incorporated “prescribed corporations” (defined 
as distributing corporations under the CBCA,112 these are reporting issuers, or publicly traded 
companies, and have filed a prospectus with a provincial securities commission)113 must disclose 
the number of designated persons, percentage of board, whether there is a written policy in 
respect of diversity, and whether there are targets for representation.114 The changes in Bill C-25 
include the requirement to disclose the board’s gender diversity, as well as board members with 
visible minority, Aboriginal or disability status.115 The amendments do not mandate a change in 
policies or adopting specific targets (“comply”), but if the corporation does not have policies, it 
needs to state why (“explain”). 
Unfortunately, only prescribed corporations are required to comply.116 Thus, only publicly traded 
companies registered under the CBCA will be subject to these new disclosure requirements.117 
Many are unsatisfied with the updates.118 The New Democratic Party voted against Bill C-25 on 
the grounds that the bill did not go far enough in advancing diversity rights.119 The new CBCA 
regulations indicate that the information respecting gender diversity required by NI 58-101 
needs to be disclosed at every annual shareholder meeting, which basically means that the CoE 
model is duplicated. The scope of diversity is broader than in NI 58-101,120 however, and appears 
more consistent with a human rights approach and justification.
CoE is the standard of corporate governance in Australia and the United Kingdom.121 Introduced 
in 1992 by the Cadbury Report,122 and implemented in the Stewardship Code,123 CoE has been 
110 Bill C-25, supra note 2; Nova Scotia, Companies Act, RSNS, c 81; Ontario, Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B16. 
For considerations when selecting a jurisdiction, see McInnes Cooper, “5 Key Considerations When Deciding Between 
Federal & Provincial Incorporation”, online: <www.mcinnescooper.com/publications/weighing-the-options-5-key-
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Canada?” (14 May 2018), online: <www.lawsonlundell.com/the-business-law-blog/bill-c-25-a-catalyst-for-corporate-
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115 Employment Equity Act, supra note 3.
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117 Venture issuers are not exempt. See Rima Ramchandani & Glen Johnson, Torys LLP, News Release, “CBCA Reforms 
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118 “Vote #348 on June 21st, 2017” re Bill C-25 [“Vote #348”], online: Open Parliament <https://openparliament.ca/
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<www.canadianlawyermag.com/article/women-on-boards-and-the-comply-or-explain-rule-3542/>.
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partly responsible for increasing board representation of women on the FTSE.124 Unfortunately, 
some UK firms neither comply nor explain their non-compliance, and the regulations do not 
give any regulatory power to induce action.125 Australia has slightly more onerous provisions.126 
Yet, in essence, authorities regulate on whether a statement was made, not on the statement’s 
substantive merit.127 Securities regulators, in general, do not opine on the adequacy or merits of 
an investment or solution, only whether the broad public interest is considered.128 
Quota Systems
Countries that have instituted mandatory quotas have higher levels of female board 
representation, and have achieved these levels more rapidly, than countries that have opted for 
CoE.129 Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy and Spain have all implemented stringent 
quotas, while India has implemented a weak quota system.130 Germany requires 50 percent 
female representation, which was set in 2018, and also requires 3,500 medium-sized businesses 
to set their own targets to increase the number of women.131 Quotas do work, at least in the 
short term, and can help legitimize female representation in the long term.132 
There are drawbacks with quotas, including companies de-listing, going private or registering in 
another country.133 There have been accusations of the promotion of “golden skirts” — women 
who hold a number of directorships, or figurehead directors promoted due to their celebrity 
status.134 The cascading effect also has not materialized, as had been promised.135 Quotas may 
result in “tokenism,” which is based on a suspicion that a woman is only appointed for legal 
purposes rather than for merit, causing a host of problems, including alienation and assimilation 
of the female director (that is, the director is not seen as an individual, but rather as a stereotype). 
The CSA Roundtable noted that “even when you have quotas in place and the numbers have 
risen quickly at the board level, there actually hasn’t been the knock on effect, the cascading 
effect, into the executive teams that they had hoped for. Now it’s possible that because Norway, 
for instance, kind of had to hollow out the female executives to move them up to the board that 
we have not seen the next generation of women come up, so maybe we need to give it more 
time.”136
124 Catalyst, Gender Diversity on Boards in Canada: Recommendations for Accelerating Progress (Ontario: Catalyst & Province 
of Ontario, 2016) at 25; FTSE Women, supra note 58 at 25, 30.
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Norway, in 2004, implemented a quota system.137 The Norwegian stock market is small, with 
approximately 190 companies.138 They do not have a large mining sector, so comparisons to 
Canada and Australia are difficult. Four of the largest six companies, representing 46.1 percent 
of the Norsk Index, are significantly owned by the government.139 Canada’s stock market is 
widely held, such that “investors are not likely to have the same influence on those companies.”140 
This is also true for the United Kingdom, where “the dispersed ownership structure that exists 
in the UK can create hindrances to effective organization of shareholders so as to hold directors 
accountable.”141 
Making comparisons between countries is likely to overlook the myriad of complexities and 
nuances that cannot be fully assessed in a cursory analysis. No two countries share identical 
legislative or governance frameworks, board structures or initiatives to help drive female 
representation on listed company boards. The varying size of a country’s index makes comparisons 
difficult. One can simply observe that CoE and quotas recognize the need for gender-balanced 
boards, and many firms are now implementing processes to achieve greater numbers of women 
on boards and in executive positions.142 
Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Law 
and Policy Reform 
The problem of a lack of diversity, and in particular gender diversity, on Canadian corporate 
mining boards is multi-faceted. First, the problem represents a failure of women’s empowerment 
and equality, and a failure to respect the equal rights of women to participate in economic activity 
in the mining industry. Solutions to the problem conceptualized in this way might include 
implementing quotas in university engineering programs to ensure that sufficient women are 
educated and ready to enter the mining industry, work their way up to senior management 
and eventually join a corporate board. However, a second way to view the problem is from 
the perspective of women and girls who are subject to gender-based human rights violations 
as a result of industrial mining practices. This perspective might suggest that replicating the 
educational backgrounds of those already in positions of power within the mining industry 
would not serve to help management and boards to understand the problems facing women, 
whether as employees or as members of communities affected by mining. Could it be that part 
of the problem is with the kinds of educational expectations that exist for corporate board 
members? 
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The excuses for a lack of women in boardrooms point to many factors, ranging from the sublime 
to the ridiculous.143 In Canada, the top reasons include that more women would compromise 
the principles of meritocracy; that more women may not result in the best candidates being 
selected; that corporations frequently have a small number of directors, with low turnover; 
and that existing policies are ineffective or arbitrary.144 It must be acknowledged that in the 
mining sector, there may be differences between junior mining companies and senior producing 
companies, differences that require further study. 
The idea that it is important to encourage more women in business145 and engineering146 is well 
accepted. Universities might consider following Engineers Canada’s lead by mandating at least 30 
percent of all types of engineering and computer science classes be female by no later than 2030. 
To date, there are no quotas in Canadian universities, but some people, such as the Institution of 
Engineering and Technology’s first female president, Naomi Climer, have called on the engineering 
sector to bring in quotas.147 Yet humans exhibit boundedly rational behaviour in decision making 
(that is, we often make poor, but predictable, decision-making errors).148 This bias results in better 
treatment of “in”-group members (males) than members of stigmatized or “out” groups (women). 
This may also result in the use of heuristics, or mental shortcuts, pursuant to which certain attributes 
(in this case, being male) are seen as better suited to board and senior management positions, 
creating a conjunction fallacy that white males with experience (in law or business) make good 
candidates. The negative effect of such bias creates what behavioural economists term a “blind 
spot problem.”149 This suggests that the solution may not be as simple as having more women in 
STEM programs, but also that men with power need to value expertise from other disciplines 
that better support the human rights-respecting and environmentally conscious decision making 
that is essential for mining sustainability. This is particularly so once intersectional dimensions 
are considered, and the value of Indigenous knowledge, including gendered dimensions of such 
knowledge, is recognized.150
Women have a positive effect on the bottom line, and increasing the number of women on 
boards is correlated with increased attention to environmental and social responsibility, and better 
decision making. Thus, a second recommendation is for more active institutional and retail investor 
involvement.151 State Street Global Advisors will engage in active dialogues with companies 
and board leadership on gender diversity, and if companies fail to take action to increase the 
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number of women on their boards, they will vote against the chairs of the boards’ nominating 
and/or governance committees.152 Bank of Montreal, a large financial institution, launched the 
BMO Women in Leadership Fund to invest in companies promoting “gender diverse leadership 
environments.”153 RBC Royal Bank, Canada’s largest financial institution, launched the RBC 
Vision Women’s Leadership MSCI Canada Index ETF, focusing on companies that demonstrate 
commitment to gender diversity as part of their CSR strategy.154 The Pax Ellevate Global Women’s 
Leadership Fund allows investors to close the gender gap by investing in companies that value 
women as leaders.155 This is the first mutual fund that invests in the highest-rated companies in the 
world for advancing women through gender diversity.156 And in 2020, Goldman Sachs announced 
it would no longer take companies public if they have an all-white, all-male board, and will force 
an increase to two diverse directors in 2021.157 If Canadian financial institutions follow suit, as 
arguably they should, this will have a major positive impact on the mining sector. Thus, it will 
be the financial institutions themselves that implement a quota system, rather than waiting for a 
government to bring in regulation. It also sends the signal that a single change in board diversity 
membership is not enough to have a meaningful impact. 
Another issue is the lack of vacancies. Implementing term limits and mandating at least one 
female candidate for all board and CEO vacancies is recommended.158 If a woman is not selected 
by the end of this process, the board must be satisfied that there is an objective reason to support 
this outcome. The board should also have a diversity and/or inclusion committee.159 While the 
Goldman Sachs initiative currently applies to initial public offerings, a similar policy for follow-
on offerings (secondary stock sales, debt issuances and others) will put pressure on firms to enact 
term limits, as the only options for the company are to increase the board size or to rotate board 
vacancies. 
A fourth recommendation is to create a new model with soft targets, stretch goals and hard floors. 
The 30 by 30 program is an example. It is a soft target, but as soon as it is reached, it becomes a 
mandatory floor. More work is required for several industry sectors, especially mining, and the 
work on gender parity on boards must go much further than publicly traded corporations and 
include privately held and state-owned enterprises.160 The CBCA amendments do not go far 
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enough. Private company directors reported similar proportions of women on their boards as 
public company directors.161 The WGBHR highlights the need for state-owned enterprises to play 
a leading role in gender diversity.162 The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board created a Global 
Gender Diversity Voting Practice, to vote against the chair responsible for director nominations if 
the board has no women directors.163 Internationally, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions as well as Principles for Responsible Investment created guides for diversity in 2016 
and 2017, respectively, yet no concrete actions have yet been taken.164 
Future amendments must take a tougher stance in setting normative standards (for example, 30 
percent of boards should be filled with women by 2020) and require compliance (or detailed 
reasons and penalties for non-compliance). Canadian securities commissions must communicate 
results and educate issuers on the very existence of an unconscious bias. Quotas may have merit, 
and this method of “debiasing law” should be effectively communicated to the market, if voluntary 
measures are ineffective.165
Finally, Patricia Devine’s studies in the context of racial bias show that stereotypes can be activated 
regardless of a person’s beliefs.166 Having more women on nominating committees and represented 
as idealized board imagery could actually undermine the unconscious gender bias prevalent in the 
industry.167 While mandatory disclosures seem like a valid solution to implicit bias, there are many 
shortcomings of mandatory disclosure, such as raising trust levels.168
In conclusion, there are many possible avenues to pursue in order to address the lack of gender 
diversity in Canada’s mining sector. Among these are arguments for and against educational 
requirements due to conscious and unconscious bias. Women who do make it to board levels 
tend to have more advanced levels of education than their male counterparts, yet women have 
low enrolment in the kinds of degree programs (specifically engineering and master of business 
administration [MBA] programs) that are seen as most important to get them onto boards. But 
is this a cause or an effect? That is, is part of the problem that MBAs and STEM backgrounds are 
seen as important for boards? Is education needed to change the perception of what is valuable on 
boards? Further research is required on this subject. 
Canadian law has yet to take seriously Canada’s international law obligations to prevent and 
remedy violations of the human rights of women and girls arising from resource extraction. 
Women’s empowerment through board and management diversity initiatives may be a crucial 
piece of the solution.
161 Catalyst, supra note 124 at 15.
162 WGBHR, Gender dimensions, supra note 35, Guiding Principle 4.
163 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB), News Release, “Canada Pension Plan Investment Board to Increase 
Board Diversity Advocacy” (21 December 2018), online: <www.cppib.com/en/public-media/headlines/2018/cppib-
increase-board-diversity-advocacy/>; CPPIB, News Release, “How CPPIB is advocating for more women on boards”  
(25 October 2018), online: <www.cppib.com/en/public-media/headlines/2018/how-cppib-advocating-more-women-
boards/>. 
164 Principles for Responsible Investment, Engaging on Director Nominations: An Investor Guide (2017) at 11; International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, Report on Corporate Governance (2016) FR10/16 at 19.
165 Willey, supra note 94 at 210.
166 Ibid at 197.
167 Ibid at 203.
168 Ibid.
